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NOTES
WAITS V. FRITO-LAY, INC.
THE NINTH CIRCUIT RIDES THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
DOWN A SLIPPERY SLOPE
"Nothing today, likely nothing since we tamed fire, is genuinely
new: Culture, like science and technology, grows by accretion,
each new creator building on the works of those who came
before. Overprotection stifles the very creative forces it's
supposed to nurture."'
I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine that as the members of the rock group Nirvana2 finish their
performance on the 1992 MTV Music Awards,3 the band begins destroying
their instruments. The drummer kicks his set over and the guitarist swings

his guitar as if hitting a Nolan Ryan fastball, knocking his amplifier out of
the park. When the band reaches the backstage dressing room, they are
confronted by attorneys for Johnny Lydon, lead singer of the now-defunct
punk rock group, the Sex Pistols. 4 The attorneys serve the successful

young band with a complaint charging that Nirvana's performances infringe
upon the Sex Pistols' common law "right of publicity" 5 by copying the
1. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
2. Nirvana is an alternative rock band whose debut album, Nevermind,was certified quadruple
platinum after selling 4 million copies. Paul Grein, PlatinumAlbums Down, Singles Up; Brooks
Top-Selling Artist In First Half,BILLBOARD, July 18, 1992, at 10.
3. MTV is Music Television, a 24 hour cable channel that broadcasts a mix of rock music
videos and music-related news.
4. The Sex Pistols were the vanguard band for the "punk rock" movement of the late '70s,
but broke up in 1978 after a mere two years of existence. See Greg Kot, When Punk Was King,
Cm. TRm., Nov. 11, 1990, at C6. This breakup followed after only one United States tour. Id.
Even so, their debut album, Never Mind the Bollocks, Here's the Sex Pistols,reached the platinum
(one million album sales) mark in 1992. Tom Popson, Punk/New Wave Era to Return on
Upcoming CDs, Cm. TRIm., May 8, 1992, at Q. As ambassadors of the angry punk sound, the
Pistols often closed their shows by destroying their instruments.
5. See infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. See generallyJ. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE
RIGHTS OF PUBiCrrY AND PRIVACY § 1.6 at 1-27 to 1-47 [hereinafter MCCARTHY].
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performance style of the Sex Pistols. This complaint urges the court to
enjoin the group from ending its performances by destroying their
instruments and to award damages. After Nirvana pays these damages, the
Sex Pistols turn around and pay damages to the veteran rock band, The
Who,6 to satisfy a judgment for infringing upon The Who's right of
publicity.
The above hypothetical is not as far-fetched as it may seem. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc." ("Waits")

created a new cause of action for imitating a performer's style under the
common law right of publicity.' This tort might best be characterized as
"style misappropriation," and Waits extended the standard for protecting an
individual's style through the right of publicity further than previously

allowed in any court.9 Indeed, until Midler v. Ford Motor Co. 0 ("Midler") and Waits, claims involving only "voice misappropriation" were
relegated to the doctrine of unfair competition." With one exception,
however, courts had refused to grant relief to a plaintiff invoking unfair
competition in appropriation cases.' 2
The Ninth Circuit found that Tom Waits could recover under a right
of publicity cause of action by expanding its prior decision in Midler,
which granted recovery based upon the common law tort of voice
6. The Who is a rock band that has toured the world several times since its beginning in
1964. In 1990, after 26 years of existence, the band placed seventeenth on Forbes' list of the
highest paid entertainers for the previous two years. Forbes Top 40: The World's HighestPaid
Entertainers, FORBES, Oct. 1, 1990, at 142. In this case, The Who, being known for its
predilection to destroy their instruments after a show, would have claimed that Nirvana had
invaded their right of publicity in their performance style.
7. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993).
8. Id.
9. See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 714 (9th Cir. 1970) (finding
that as long as the defendant had a legal right to use the composition, imitation of plaintiff's voice
was not a legally cognizable claim); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 347
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (plaintiff could not show any infringement of right of publicity through voice
misappropriation); Davis v. Trans World Airlines, 297 F. Supp. 1145, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 1969)
C"lIMmitation alone does not give rise to a cause of action."). See also Felix H. Kent, California
Court Expands Celebrities'Rights, N.Y. L., Oct. 30, 1992, at 3.
10. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
11. Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 714; Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cit. 1962); Booth,
362 F. Supp at 345. Cf. Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 341 N.E.2d 817, 820 (N.Y. 1975) ("Absent
a claim of unfair competition, a competitor may appropriate any musical arrangement which is
not so distinctive as to constitute a separate musical entity."); Miller v. Universal Pictures, Co.,
201 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Sup. Ct. 1960) ("[In] the absence of palming off or confusion... others might
have meticulously ... imitated [Glenn Miller's] renditions.").
12. Of the cases cited supra note 11, Lahr was the only case in which the plaintiff's unfair
competition claim was accepted by the court. Lahr, 300 F.2d at 259.
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as style cannot fit under what has been deemed a "property right."'
II. BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF VOICE MISAPPROPRIATION
The evolution of the voice misappropriation doctrine reflects a
dichotomy between the Ninth Circuit and other state courts and legislatures.

Fourteen states, including California,' have enacted statutes protecting the
right of publicity by prohibiting the unauthorized use of another's "name,"
"portrait," "photograph," "picture" or "likeness."' Some statutes also
prohibit the unauthorized use of one's "voice." '
Courts have generally
read these statutes rather narrowly,' understanding "voice" to mean an
actual recording of the individual's voice27 and interpreting "likeness" to
mean only a visual representation.' As other courts have restricted these
terms, however, the Ninth Circuit has moved in the opposite direction by
expanding the breadth of the common law right of publicity.

A short

analysis of the development of the right of publicity through common law
and statutory channels is helpful in understanding the Ninth Circuit's

22. See infra part V. See also Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 ("By analogy the common law rights
are also property rights."); Motschenbacher v. RJ.Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825-26
(9th Cir. 1974) (recognizing a proprietary interest in one's identity); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316
F. Supp. 1277, 1280 (D. Minn. 1970) (invasion of privacy involving a pecuniary right is an
"interference with property").
23. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1993); KY.REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984 & Supp. 1992); MASS.
GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 214, § 3A (West 1988 & Supp. 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-201 to 20211 (1987); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 598.980-598.988 (Michie Supp. 1991); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839.1-839.3 (West
1983 & Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAwS §§ 9-1-28 to 9-1-28.1 (1985 & Supp. 1992); TEM. CODE
ANN. 99 47-25-1101 to 47-25-1108 (1988 & Supp. 1992); TOx PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 26.00126.015 (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-1 to 45-3-6 (1988 & Supp. 1990); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-40 (Michie 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992).
24. Of the state statutes cited supra note 23, Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska,
New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin protect either name, likeness,
photograph, portrait or picture, or some combination thereof, while excluding protection for voice.
25. Of the state statutes cited supra note 23, only California, Nevada and Texas recognize
some form of protection for the unauthorized use of one's voice.
26. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g en
banc denied 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.denied 113 S.Ct. 2443 (1993) (refusing to hold
that a robotic figure resembling the plaintiff was a likeness for a section 3344 claim); Midler, 849
F.2d at 463 ("Likeness refers to a visual image, not a vocal imitation.'); Lahr, 300 F.2d at 258
(limiting New York right of privacy statute to "name, portrait, or picture ... .
27. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
28. hi; Lahr,300 F.2d at 258; Nurmi v. Peterson, No. CV 88-5436-WMB, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9765, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 1989).
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Voice misappropriation is an offshoot of the right of

publicity, which the Waits court described as "the right of a person whose
identity has
commercial value... to control the commercial use of that
14
identity."'
Although both Waits and Midler involved alleged imitations of the
plaintiffs' voices for commercials, there is a crucial difference between the
two cases."5 In Midler,the defendants used a sound-alike performer to rerecord a song previously made popular by singer Bette Midler."
Conversely, the defendants in Waits used a song that had never been
recorded by any artist, including Tom Waits. Instead, Frito-Lay wrote an
original composition specifically for the commercial. 7
The Ninth Circuit overlooked the differences between a claim based
upon the imitation of a previous recording (e.g. Midler) and a claim based
purely upon similarities in vocal style (e.g. Waits). This distinction gave
the Waits court an opportunity to place limits upon reckless application of
the Midler tort of voice misappropriation. Unfortunately, the court declined
to do so. The Ninth Circuit chose instead to expand the Midler tort of
voice misappropriation, establishing a precedent that subverts traditional
copyright law and chills both creativity and opportunity.
This Note will discuss the misapplication of the Midler standard in
Waits. It will first present the evolution of the voice misappropriation tort
from the right of privacy through state statutory and common law up to
Midler and Waits.' s Next, this Note will address the background and facts
of Waits. 9 This Note will then introduce the holding and reasoning of the
Waits court and explain how the Ninth Circuit misapplied its own
standard from Midler in Waits.2 Finally, this Note will analyze the
implications of the Waits holding, concluding that there is no room for
protection of a performer's style within the rubric of the right of publicity,
13. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100. See infra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
14. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1098.
15. The district court judge acknowledged that Waits presented a "novel case." Appellant's
Opening Brief at 4, Waits v. Frito Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (No. 90-55981).
16. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461.
17. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1097.
18. See infra part II.
19. See infra part H.
20. See infra part ILB.
21. See infra part IV.
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reasoning in Waits.

A. The Right of Privacy v. The Right of Publicity
The right of privacy, as originally defined, is best known as "the right
'
to be left alone."29
Unfortunately, since the doctrine of the right of
privacy spawned the right of publicity,30 the two doctrines are often

confused with one another, despite the fact that they protect different
rights.31 The right of privacy generally ensures that one may "live without
interference by the public in matters with which the public is not...
concerned."32 The right of publicity, on the other hand, protects a
performer's "proprietary interest" in his public persona, the focus being
'
primarily on "who gets to do the publishing."33

B. Federal Statutory Law
The Copyright Act of 1976 ("the Act") provides uniform federal

protection and grants certain rights to the owner for works which fall under
its provisions.' Exclusive rights in sound recordings are governed by
subsections (1) and (3) of the Act. 35 Performers, however, often do not
own the copyrights to the works that they perform.3 6 Thus, these
performers are left unprotected because the Act expressly allows "the
making ...

of another sound recording that consists entirely of an

independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate...
29. Earl Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890-91).
30. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 1.7 at 1-33.
31. For example, New York's right of publicity statute, N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 is
entitled "Right of Privacy." See infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
32. BLACK'S LAW DIcIoNARY 1195 (6th ed. 1990).
33. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562,573 (1977). See also Carson
v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) ("[The] right of
publicity . .. [states] that a celebrity has a protected pecuniary interest in the commercial
exploitation of his identity.").
34. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) provides that the owner of a copyright has exclusive rights to
reproduce, distribute, prepare derivative works of, perform, and display the protected work.

35. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (1988).
36. See Jon Pareles, Her Style Is Imitable, But It's Her Own, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1989, §
2, at 30.
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those in the copyrighted sound recording."37 In other words, as long as
the copyrighted work is not copied directly from one source to another,
even a deliberate attempt to copy another's work is not prohibited by the
Act.

Defendants in misappropriation cases have argued that, by providing
federal law on the subject, the Act preempts common law causes of action
such as the right of publicity.38 In rejecting this argument, the courts have
relied upon 17 U.S.C. § 301, which states that any right that is "equivalent"

to the federally granted rights "in works of authorship that are fixed in a
tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of
copyright" are governed exclusively by the Act.39 Thus, no state may
grant protection to any form of media which comes within the definition of
works protected by the Act. However, since a voice is neither "fixed in a
tangible medium of expression" nor is it within the subject matter of
copyright, 4 voice misappropriation is not governed exclusively by the
Act.
Therefore, federal law offers no protection to a performer whose voice
has been appropriated in an independent, fixed medium. Nevertheless, the

Act does not bar any other state common law remedy available to a
This lack of protection in federal jurisprudence has led the
performer'
Ninth Circuit to extend the right of publicity to its present broad application.42
37. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1988); Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. No. 94-1476.
Subsection (b) of section 114... makes clear that statutory protection for sound
recordings extends only to the particular sounds of which the recording consists,
and would not prevent a separate recording of another performance in which those
sounds are imitated ....
Mere imitation of a recordedperformance would not
constitute a copyright infringement even where one performer deliberatelysets out
to simulate another'sperformance as exactly as possible.
itL (emphasis added).
38. See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100; Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1988).
40. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100; Midler, 849 F.2d at 462. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, §
4.14[E][2] at 4-93.
41. The Midlercourt found that even though "a voice is not copyrightable" under federal law,
Midler could still argue a cause of action under either CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344, see infra note 58,
or the common law right of publicity. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462-63. Note, however, that the claim
under California statutory law was unsuccessful. Id.
42. See Linda Benjamin, Comment, Tuning Up the CopyrightAct: SubstantialSimilarityAnd
Sound Recording Protection,73 MINN. L. REV. 1175, 1199-1200 (1989), for the proposition that
the Act should be amended to include a "substantial similarity" standard in the appropriation of
one's performance in a musical work. However, there would be great opposition to such a
proposal. Many popular songs are subsequently re-recorded by different artists. Copyright

1993]

RIGHT OF PUBLICHT

C. State Statutory Law

Several states have recognized the right of publicity tort by statute.43
Some, however, still address the cause of action under the right of
privacy." How to address the right involved has become a balancing act
between expression and ownership. The Second Circuit stated that 'ideas,'
... though upon them all civilization is built, may never be 'owned.' The

law does not protect them at all, but only their expression; and how far that
protection shall go is a question of more or less .... ."" The question of
"how far that protection shall go" is exemplified by the different ways in
which the New York and California courts and legislatures have treated the

development of the right of publicity. Although much of the litigation
arises in these states due to the large number of celebrities residing there,
the interpretation of the rights differs widely.

1. New York
New York addresses misappropriation claims under New York Civil
Code sections 50 and 51. ' Section 50 provides, in pertinent part, that:

"A person.., that uses for advertising purposes... the name, portrait or
picture of any living person without having first obtained the written
consent of such person

. . .

is guilty of a misdemeanor."47 Section 51

allows a plaintiff to enjoin the wrongful use of the traits described in
section 50 or to collect damages.

The New York statute, unlike

owners derive much income from advertising agencies or artists that want to use the song
commercially. For example, "a songwriter whose musical composition, once released, is released
again as a different rendition by another artist who sells I million phonorecords, will earn...
$40,000 under the current royalty rate." Robert Thorne, Compulsory Licensing: The Music
Makers as Money Makers, 1985 ENT. PUB. & THE ARTS HANDBOOK, at 281. If federal law
protected sound-alikes, the incentive to buy the license of a classic song and re-record it would
be destroyed, for fear of sounding too similar to the original and creating potential liability. One
could imagine the chilling effect that an ill-defined "substantially similar" standard would have
on the incomes of these copyright holders. See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d
711,718 (9th Cir. 1970).
43. See supra note 23.
44. Of the state statutes cited supra note 23, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island
and Wisconsin recognize the right under the title of "Right of Privacy" or "Right to Privacy."
45. RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1940).
46. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1990).
47. Id § 50.
48. Id § 51.
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California's, does not include voice as a trait which can be misappropriated.' Consequently, sound-alike claims will likely fail in New York, as
courts have been reluctant to extend coverage under the statute to media
falling outside the scope of the plain language of the statute.50
However, the court in Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co."'
("Tin Pan Apple"), did adopt an expanded view of the statutory language
with respect to visual representations. In Tin Pan Apple, a rap group
known as the Fat Boys sued Miller Brewing Co. after the defendant's
advertising agency produced a television spot which featured "three [Fat
Boys] look-alikes performing in the distinctly [Fat Boys] style ...."52
The suit was based on, among other claims, an invasion of the plaintiffs'
right of publicity under New York's Civil Rights Law sections 50 and
51.51 The court found that "physical similarity" between the plaintiffs and
the defendant's representations constituted a valid cause of action under
Therefore, if the New York legislature decides to
sections 50 and 51.s
add "voice" to its statute, the courts might apply a "similarity" standard to
voice misappropriation claims.
If New York declines to add "voice" to section 50, however, it is not
likely that a case like Waits or Midler would be successful in that state.
New York treats the rights of publicity and privacy as merely two forms of
the same doctrine, combining them under a general statutory right of
privacy."5 In Stephano v. News Group Publications,Inc.16 ("Stephano"),
the New York Court of Appeals held that the common law right of
publicity in New York was expressly granted by statute as it was subsumed
Therefore, there is currently no recognized
into sections 50 and 51.s
common law right of publicity in the state of New York, preventing the
type of judicial legislation that has occurred in the Ninth Circuit.
49. See infra note 58.
50. See, e.g., Tim Pan Apple, Inc., v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 838 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (finding that New York's statute does not apply to voice); Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300
F.2d 256, 258 (1st Cir. 1962) (finding that New York's statute does not apply to voice).
51. 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
52. Id.at 828.
53. Id.
at 837. See also Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding that
54. id.
a cartoon of boxer Muhammad All constituted a likeness); Onassis v. Christian Dior - New York,

Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (holding that resemblance is enough to trigger an action
under §§ 50-51).
55. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
56. 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984).
57. Id. at 584.
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2. California

California Civil Code section 3344 governs misappropriation of
voice,5 8 providing that "any person who knowingly uses another's . . .
voice . . for the purposes of advertising or selling . . . without such
person's prior consent... shall be liable for any damages sustained by the
person."59 The statute was amended in 1984 to include voice misappropriation." One feature of the California law, not found in New York's
statute, is that the remedies embodied in section 3344 are expressly
cumulative and "in addition to any others provided for by law."'" This
provides the leeway needed for the courts to fashion additional relief, such
as an expanded common law right of publicity independent of section
3344. 62 However, not wishing to adopt New York's "similarity" standard
offered in Tin Pan Apple, 63 the Ninth Circuit has restricted claims based
upon section 3344 voice misappropriation to the use of the individual's
actual voice."4 In other words, unless a recording of the individual's voice
is taken directly from one source for use in another recording, no cause of
action lies under section 3344.65

58. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1993).
59. Id § 3344(a).

60. Due to the lack of available legislative history, the purpose of the amendment, other than
to protect a performer from unauthorized, actual duplication of his voice, remains unclear. Some
urge the courts to interpret the plain language of the statute to include one who "engages in any
vocal imitation of a distinctive celebrity voice ... ." Katherine L. Blanck, Comment, Restricting
the Use of "Sound-Alikes" in Commercial Speech by Amending the Right of Publicity Statute in

California,26 SAN DiMGO L. REV. 911, 931 (1989) (emphasis omitted). However, the courts have
not been willing to extend § 3344 any further than the mandates of the language. See Midler, 849
F.2d at 463; White, 971 F.2d at 1397.
61. CAL Civ. CODE § 3344(g).
62. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 ("[Section 3344] does not preclude Midler from pursuing any
cause of action she may have at common law."). Contra Stephano v. News Group Publications,
Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984) (reading New York's statutory right of privacy as
enveloping the right of publicity).
63. 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
64. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 ("The term likeness' refers to a visual image not a vocal
imitation.").
65. Id.
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1. Pre-Midler

The term "right of publicity" was first recognized in 1953 in Haelan
Laboratories,Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. ("Haelan").66 In Haelan,
the plaintiff, a chewing gum manufacturer, entered into an exclusive
contract with a baseball player to portray his image on trading cards.'
The defendants, competitors of the plaintiff, were aware that the plaintiff
had such a contract, but had induced the baseball player to enter into a
similar contract and used the athlete's image on their trading cards.68 The
defendants advanced the novel defense that the contract created between the
ballplayer and the plaintiff "was no more than a release by the ball-player
to plaintiff of the liability which, absent the release, plaintiff would have
incurred in using the ball-player's [image], because [an unauthorized use]
...would be an invasion of his right of privacy ... ."19 The defendants
further argued that, since this right of privacy is not assignable, the
plaintiffs had no cause of action.70 The Second Circuit disagreed,
however, asserting that the ballplayer's right, called the "right of publicity,"
was a right "in addition to and independent of" the right of privacy. 7' The
court rejected the defendants' argument that a party's only legal interest in
the use of his picture for commercial purposes was a right of privacy.7 2
In so doing, the court found that this right, in the interest of commerce, is
exclusively assignable by the owner of the right.73 However, the Haelan
court left subsequent courts without any guidance as to the parameters of
the right of publicity. This void is especially troublesome as the court's
expression of the right included the right to exclusive use, creating a
copyright-like monopoly without the federally mandated limitations. 74
66. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
67. lId at 867.
68. I&
69. id.
70. I1&
71. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868.
72. Had the court accepted this argument, the plaintiff's cause of action would be prevented
as, in New York, the "statutory right of privacy is personal, not assignable." Id.at 867. Thus, the
plaintiff could not sue on the ballplayer's behalf.
73. Id. at 868.
74. In RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), the court noted that
"[copyright in any form, whether statutory or at common-law, is a monopoly; it consists only in
the power to prevent others from reproducing the copyrighted work." Id at 88. The Copyright
Act of 1976 limits the duration of this monopoly (in works created after January 1, 1978) to the
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Haelan, a New York case, is noteworthy because it signalled the end
of the Second Circuit's sole reliance upon the statutory right of privacy
embodied in New York Civil Code sections 50 and 51.75 The development of a common law right of publicity enabled the New York courts to
escape from the confines of the right of privacy statute. 6 However, the
that
New York Court of Appeals retreated from this view in 1984, holding
77
there is no common law right of publicity, only a statutory version.
A common law right of publicity was first established in California
in Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. ("Motschenbacher").'8
Similar in some respects to Waits,79 Motschenbacher involved the
unauthorized use of professional race car driver Lothar Motschenbacher's
automobile in an advertisement for Winston cigarettes."0 Motschenbacher
was known for the distinctive way in which he adorned his race car to
make it more readily identifiable as his own."1 The driver of the car was
not recognizable in the advertisement, yet Motschenbacher sued Reynolds
for misappropriation of his name, likeness, personality and endorsement.8 2
The court noted that the injury caused in privacy cases usually involved
only damage to personal feelings. 3 However, where what has been
appropriated has commercial value, as in Motschenbacher,the injury may
be entirely economic. This type of injury had not yet been contemplated
life of the author and fifty years after the author's death. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988). See also

Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831, 840 (6th Cir. 1983) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) ("Protection under the right of publicity confers a monopoly on the protected
individual that is potentially broader, offers fewer protections and potentially competes with
federal statutory monopolies.").
75. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 1.7 at 1-31 to 1-34.

76. The court noted that public figures "would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received
money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers,
magazines, busses, trains and subways." Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868. The court thus recognized the
need for financial rewards where one's likeness is appropriated.
77. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
78. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).

79. The alleged misappropriation was accomplished through the use of several elements of
Motschenbacher's persona. I& at 822. Similarly, Waits argued that elements from different times
of Waits' career were used to complete the misappropriation. Appellee's Answering Brief at 23,
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (No. 90-55981).
80. Motschenbacher,498 F.2d at 822. Reynolds had changed the identifying number from

"11" to "71," added a spoiler to the car, and added the name "Winston" to the spoiler. I&
81. Id.Motschenbacher used a distinctive narrow white pinstriping on a solid red car body,
as well as placing the number " 11" in an oval shape, as opposed to the circular background
commonly used on other cars. IM.
82. Id.
83. Id.at 824 (citing Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 197 (Cal.
1955)).
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in traditional right of privacy theory.

4

Writing on a blank slate,8s the court declined to categorize the right
as one of "property," "privacy," or "publicity."8 6 Instead, it found that an
individual has a recognizable and protectible interest in one's identity which
has commercial value." Further, unauthorized use of that identity is an
actionable tort although the injury may be solely economic in nature. 8
Although allowing a common law cause of action, the Motschenbacher
court maintained the distinction between the statutory right and the common
law right.8 9 The common law right of publicity has since become a wellestablished cause of action in California.'
Plaintiffs in states which recognize a common law right of publicity
have an advantage in that courts in those states generally read the common
law version more liberally than the statutory version.9 In Hirsch v. S.C.
Johnson & Sons, Inc.' ("Hirsch"), the defendants had advertised a
women's shaving gel named "Crazylegs."93 The defendants were aware
that "Crazylegs" was also the nickname of professional football player
Elroy Hirsch. In finding that Hirsch was entitled to an action under the
common law right of publicity, the court noted that Hirsch had a commercial market for his nickname, as he had appeared in advertisements in
which he was identified as "Crazylegs." 9 Even though "Crazylegs" was
only a nickname, the court held that Hirsch was entitled to a cause of
action if "the name clearly identif[ied] the wronged person."95
84. 1M at 824-25.
85. The court found that, although there were no cases on point, all prior appropriation cases
had relied primarily on the "privacy" aspect of the tort. Motschenbacher,498 F.2d at 825.

86. Id. at 826.
87. Id. at 825.
88. Id. at 825-26.

89. ld. at 826 n.16.
90. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1098; Midler, 849 F.2d at 463; White, 971 F.2d at 1397; Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr.
342, 347 (Ct. App. 1983). The Eastwood court clearly defined the fundamentals of the tort: "A
common law cause of action for appropriation of name or likeness may be pleaded by alleging
(1) the defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff's name or
likeness to defendant's advantage... ; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury." Eastwood,
198 Cal. Rptr. at 347 (citing PRoSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 804-07 (4th ed. 1971)).
91. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983);
Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849

F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
92. 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979).
93. Id. at 130.

94. Id. at 131-32.
95. Id. at 137.
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96
Similarly, in Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.
("Carson"), the Sixth Circuit authorized an extension of the common law
right.97 In Carson, the defendants advertised their portable toilets using
the phrase "Here's Johnny," a well-known phrase that was used to
introduce Johnny Carson, the former host of the late-night talk show The
Tonight Show. 98 The court reversed the lower court's dismissal of
Carson's right of publicity claim, concluding that one's "identity may be
appropriated in various ways." 99 Relying on Motschenbacherand Hirsch,
the court reiterated that infringement of an individual's right of publicity
may take place even in the absence of a use of that individual's name,
picture, or likeness."re The court further stated that the common law right
of publicity may be invaded in various ways, opening the door for claims
such as the one that Bette Midler asserted five years later in California. 10 '

2. Midler v. Ford Motor Co.
In 1985, Ford Motor Co. and their advertising company, Young &
Rubicam, Inc., embarked on a campaign to advertise the Ford Lincoln
Mercury."° Young & Rubicam approached Bette Midler, a nationallyknown actress and singer, to reprise the song "Do You Want to Dance,"
which she had made popular on her 1973 recording, The Divine Miss
M. 3 However, Midler declined to associate herself with the advertising
campaign."° Undaunted, the advertising agency sought out Ula Hedwig,
a former Midler backup singer, and "told [her] to 'sound as much as
Bette Midler sued both
possible like the Bette Midler record,' ...
Ford and Young & Rubicam. °6
The court first noted that section 3344 was of no help to Midler, as
96. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
97. The Sixth Circuit felt that "the district court's conception of the right of publicity [was]
too narrow." Id at 835.
98. Id at 833. Carson left The Tonight Show in 1992, after thirty years as the host. Lisa
Gubemick & Peter Newcomb, The Top 40, FORBES, Sept. 27, 1993, at 97. Thus, Carson had one
of the most high profile and recognizable jobs in television.
99. Carson, 698 F.2d at 837.
100. Id at 835.
101. See infra part H.D.2.
102. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461.
103. Id
104. Id
105. Id
106. Id at 460-61.
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the defendants did not use her "name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness, in any manner."'" The court did, however, use section 3344's
companion statute, section 990,"8 to reach its conclusion." 9 Since
section 990 creates a "property right" in the holder of the statutory right of
publicity, the court analogized that the holder of a common law right must
also hold a corresponding property right." ° Next, the court returned to
its reasoning in Motschenbacher,that an individual holds a proprietary right
in his own identity that a court may recognize and protect."' Thus,
finding that Midler owned what was now a property right, the court used
of action
Motschenbacher to conclude that Midler was entitled to a cause
2
for voice misappropriation under California common law."
Reversing the district court's summary judgment in favor of the
defendant, the Midler court formulated a cause of action known today as
voice misappropriation: "We hold only that when a distinctive voice of a
professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to
what is not theirs and have
sell a product, the sellers have' appropriated
3
committed a tort in California."
After creating this new extension of the right of publicity, the court
carved out what appeared to be a possible exception, but unfortunately
failed to give subsequent courts any guidance as to how to apply the tort.
After asserting that "to impersonate [one's] voice is to pirate [his] identity,"
the court stopped short of full endorsement of the tort, stating that they
"need not and do not go so far as to hold that every imitation of a voice to
advertise merchandise is actionable.".. 4 It is upon this untested statement
of the law that the Waits court relied in order to further expand the right of
publicity in California.

107. Midler, 849 F.2d at 460-61.
108. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993). Section 990 governs the
inheritability of California's statutory rights of privacy and publicity contained in § 3344.
109. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
110. Id.
111. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
112. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463. Far from feeling that it had stretched Motschenbacherto new

limits, the court relied on the assertion that a voice is a much more personal aspect of one's
identity than is a car. Id
113. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
114. Id
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Ill. THE WAITS COURT
A. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.-Statement of the Facts

Tom Waits is a professional singer who has recorded over seventeen
albums and has gained a loyal following." 5 The Waits court noted that
he was not a "musical superstar" but rather a "prestige artist.""' 6 Waits'
voice has been described as "raspy... like how you'd sound if you drank
a quart of bourbon, smoked a pack of cigarettes, and swallowed a pack of
razor blades."""7 Waits maintained a policy of avoiding commercial
endorsements, and he made his position publicly known. u
In part,
Waits' reluctance to participate stems from his regret after once doing a dog
food commercial, after which Waits felt that he had "betrayed himself."'1 9
Crucial to the plaintiff's case was the fact that Waits had rejected a
previous offer by Frito-Lay's advertising agency to endorse Diet Coke.2
In fact, the defendants had "never heard anybody say no so fast in [their]

li[ves].''
In 1988, Frito-Lay initiated a radio advertising campaign to promote
its new Doritos corn chip, SalsaRio Doritos.1' Co-defendant TraceyLocke, Inc., Frito Lay's advertising agency, created the campaign in
question." In keeping with the spicy flavor of the chips, Tracey-Locke
115. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1097.
116. Id Factors such as number of albums released, critical success, awards and nominations,
articles written about the performer, and appearances on television or in film go to the question
of whether Waits as a performer meets the "widely known" requirement of the Midler tort. See
supra note 113 and accompanying text. In Waits' favor was the fact that he had received a
"Critic's Award" from Rolling Stone magazine, an Academy Award nomination, and had sold out
concerts in America, Europe, Australia and Japan. Appellee's Answering Brief at 2-3, Waits (No.
90-55981).
117. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1097.
118. Id This factor was critical in Waits' compensatory damage claim. California has held
that "mental distress damages may be recovered for 'shame, humiliation, embarrassment [and]
anger."' Id at 1103 (quoting Young v. Bank of Am., 190 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Ct. App. 1983)).
Because of Waits' outspoken stance against commercial endorsements, Waits' claim of
embarrassment and shame was easy to prove. He testified, "(It embarrassed me. I had to call
all my friends, (to tell them] that if they hear this thing, please be informed this is not me." Waits,
978 F.2d at 1103.
119. Appellee's Answering Brief at 3, Waits (No. 90-55981).

120. Id. at4.
121. Id
122. Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, Waits (No. 90-55981).
123. I
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created a jingle that would tie into its radio, print and television campaign.124 During the initial creative meetings, Tracey-Locke decided that
a "lively/upbeat/jazzy" style would be appropriate for the campaign,' 5 a
feeling expressed in the Tom Waits song, "Step Right Up."'' 26

In this

song Waits, ironically enough, mocks the advertising business by delivering
a "string of advertising cliches" in a deep, raspy voice.'" Tracey-Locke
decided to use Stephen Carter, a singer who, unbeknownst to the defendants
at the time, 128 was an avid Tom Waits fan and could imitate Waits fairly
well. 129 Tracey-Locke proceeded to produce a commercial that Waits
alleged was a combination of two of Waits' creations. Waits claimed that
the scat style of singing was culled from the song "Step Right Up," while
the ambience for the jingle (a smoky, crowded bar, late at night, glasses
clinking) was taken from another Waits album, Nighthawks at the
Diner.'3 Waits sued Frito-Lay and Tracey-Locke under both the Midler

tort and false endorsement under
common law voice misappropriation
3'
Act.'
Lanham
the
of
43(a)
section
124. The tongue tickler was as follows: 'Tickle your taste on the tangy tomatoes, playful
peppers, oodles of onions, and sassy spices of the new SalsaRio Doritos." Id.
125. l
126. TOM WAITs, Step Right Up, on SMALL CHANGE (Elektra/Asylum Records 1976).
127. Appellee's Answering Brief at 6, Waits (No. 90-55981).
128. Appellant's Opening Brief at 10, Waits (No. 90-55981).
129. Apparently, Carter's imitation was good enough to evoke a "stunned reaction" from
those present in the recording studio. Appellee's Answering Brief at 9, Waits (No. 90-55981).
130. Il at 23. TOM WAITS, NIGHTHAwKS AT TE DINER (Elekira/Asylum Records 1976).
131. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1096. The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (Supp. 1988), is primarily
concerned with unfair competition. Section 1125(a) reads:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services ... uses in
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof,
... or false or misleading representation of fact, which(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person, or
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her
or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged by such act.
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B. The Ninth Circuit'sHolding
Relying upon the underlying tort of voice misappropriation laid out
in Midler, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's
finding that the defendants had infringed upon Waits' common law right of
publicity and upheld the punitive damages award of two million
dollars. 3 2 The court affirmed that the trial court's jury instructions
accurately stated California law. 33 The court also affirmed Waits' claim
under the Lanham Act, finding that the "evidence was sufficient to support
the jury's findings that consumers were likely to be misled by the
commercial into believing that Waits endorsed SalsaRio Doritos."'"3
The court began its analysis by reaffirming its prior statement of the
law in Midler, that the tort of voice misappropriation occurs "when a
distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product ....,,"3s The court also upheld the
application of the voice misappropriation tort in Waits, rejecting attacks by
Frito-Lay against three elements of the jury instructions: (1) the difference
between "voice" and "style;" (2) the definition of "distinctiveness;" and (3)
the definition of "widely known."' 3 6 These three elements found in
Midler had received no subsequent judicial interpretation following Midler,
and were, therefore, vague standards when applied in Waits. 37
IV.

MISAPPLICATION OF MIDLER

A. Jury Instructions
1. "Voice" v. "Style"
"Voice" is defined as "a sound made through the mouth."'3
"Style," on the other hand, is a "specific or characteristic manner of
132. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100.
133. 1& at 1102.
134. id. at 1111.
135. Id at 1098 (quoting Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988)).
136. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100.
137. For example, the Ninth Circuit admitted that neither Waits nor Midler defined
distinctiveness. Id at 1102.
138. WEs'ER's NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLiSH LANGUAGE 2047

(2d ed. 1983).
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expression."'3 9 From these basic definitions, it is clear that what was
appropriated in Waits was a singer's style of singing, not his voice. FritoLay proposed instructions 40 that attempted to delineate the difference
between what would be protected "voice" under the Midler standard and
what would merely be one's "style" of performance, which both parties
agreed was not protectible under Midler.'4 1 The court held that the
instructions given were adequate to inform the jury that there were two
causes of action, namely a right of publicity claim and a Lanham Act claim
and, questionably, that the jury was capable of understanding that the two
142
doctrines did not mix.
The problem was enhanced by the presentation of the jury instructions, as they were unclear in both their statement of the law and in their
order of presentation. In giving the jury instructions, Judge Ideman merely
echoed the previous holding of the Ninth Circuit in Midler. "You must
decide (1) whether Tom Waits has a distinctive voice, (2) whether Tom
Waits' voice is widely known, (3) whether Tom Waits' voice was
deliberately imitated by defendants in order to sell [a product], and if so,
(4) whether Tom Waits suffered damage as a result."'4 3 This instruction
came as number forty-four in a long series of instructions which, taken as
a whole, would confuse the jury on the application of "voice!' versus
"style." For example, in instruction number twenty-five, the court had
instructed the jury as to the Lanham Act claim: "To establish his claim
against [the defendants] ... Tom Waits must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence [that] . . . (1) Tom Waits' voice, singing style, songwriting
style, and/or manner of representationare sufficiently distinctive that when
heard, they suggest that Mr. Waits is the source of the recording in
question."'" In the very next instruction (number twenty-six), Judge
Ideman reinforced the legal importance of style in instructing the jury on
the evidence of confusion: "[Y]ou may also consider: (1) The distinctiveness ... of Tom Waits' voice, songwriting style ... ; (2) The similarity
between... Tom Waits' songwriting style, and the songwritingstyle on the
...commercial... and... ; (4) The intent of [defendants] in using the
. . . songwriting style, and manner of presentation embodied in the
139. l at 1810. Defendant's expert witness also "testified that style is 'the manner in which
the performer presents the number."' Appellant's Opening Brief at 13, Waits (No. 90-55981).

140. See infra note 146.
141. Waits' attorney agreed that "style was not protected." Waits, 978 F.2d at 1101.
142. Id.
143. Court's Instruction No. 44, Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
144. Court's Instruction No. 25, Id. (emphasis added).
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commercial."' 4 s

Consequently, the trial court infused the element of style into its jury
instructions. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the instructions were
sufficiently clear to allow
the jury to understand the distinction between
"voice" and "style." 46 This conclusion assumes that the jury understood
that explicit inclusion of style in one instruction meant implicit exclusion

of style from the later instructions. Indeed, the defendants' requested jury
instructions that, if given when the right of publicity instructions were
given, would have reinforced the rule that style was not protectible under
the right of publicity.14 Lacking these qualifying instructions, it is
doubtful whether the jurors (or any individual unfamiliar with such subtle
legal distinctions) made the leap of reason required to properly distinguish
the difference between "voice" and "style."
2. "Distinctive"
The second crucial element of the Midler tort is the requirement that
the individual's voice be distinctive."" At the outset, it should be
recognized that, without more, a legal requirement of "distinctiveness" is
"a defective standard because of the inordinate difficulty in creating a
judicially workable or enforceable standard of uniqueness."' 49 Giving
jury instructions requiring that the jury merely find one's voice to be
145. Court's Instruction No. 26, Id (emphasis added).
146. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1101.
147. These instructions attempted to define "style." Although style had not been defined by

the Ninth Circuit as a legal term of art, the Waits court apparently thought that a definition was
not necessary. The instruction read, in pertinent part:
Style is the way, manner, or method of carrying out an activity .... In

contemporary music, there are a great many styles or "sounds," for example...
blues, dixieland, country and western, rock, rap, rhythm and blues, etc. Style is
how a song is sung, how the music is delivered, how the words of a song are
expressed. Style includes mood, phrasing, and timing, whether a selection is
performed loudly or quietly, Whether the song is expressed in singing, talking, or
a combination of the two. Style is not subject to ownership. No singer can
appropriate for himself any style and exclude others from performing in the same

style. Any singer is free to sing in the same style as any other singer. That is why
we have a great many opera singers, blues singers, country-western singers. etc.
Defendants could not be held liable to plaintiff merely because the singer in their
commercial performed in the same style as the plaintiff has performed in.

Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100-1101 n.2.
148. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
149. Christopher Pesce, Note, The Likeness Monster: Should the Right of Publicity Protect
Against Imitation?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 782, 821 (1990).
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"distinctive" is not enough without providing further guidelines or
parameters for the jury to follow in reaching a conclusion. A juror might
well ask, "Distinctive in relation to what?" Consequently, the Ninth Circuit
has interpreted this element to mean recognizability rather than distinctive50

ness.1

Frito-Lay argued that the instructions did not sufficiently create a
difference between having a "distinctive" voice and a merely identifiable
or recognizable voice.'
Frito-Lay presented expert evidence at trial
asserting that: (1) identifiability is enhanced by a listener's expectations;
and (2) that recognizability is increased by style similarity. 52 However,
the court refused to acknowledge that a legal distinction exists between
distinctive and identifiable, asserting that "[i]dentifiability is properly
considered in evaluating distinctiveness ....,,3 The court believed that
the use of the jury's "common sense" was a sufficient guide for determin-

ing what constituted the "minimum threshold of identifiability."'' "
In the context of voice misappropriation, "distinctive" should indicate

that the characteristic in question is capable, upon presentation, of clearly
separating itself from all others with similar characteristics. However,
lacking guidance from Midler, the standard set forth by the Ninth Circuit
fails this test. In Waits, the Ninth Circuit attempted for the first time to

establish with legal certainty the meaning of "distinctive" by stating that
"[a] voice is distinctive if it has particular qualities or characteristics that
identify it with that particular singer."' 55 The instructions closed the
universe to the jury and prohibited them from considering the relationship
between Waits' voice and any other similar voice that they might have

150. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463. In attempting to describe its approach to distinctiveness, the
Midler court offers the analogy that "[w]e are all aware that a friend is at once known by a few
words on the phone." 14 This, of course, says nothing about what legal standard the court is
applying to "distinctive," because it is not a standard which a jury could apply with any degree
of reliability. Similarly, in Waits the Ninth Circuit failed to provide the jury with a workable
legal definition of distinctiveness, bowing out by asserting that "[t]he court was not required to
formulate instructions endorsing expert opinions which lacked legal foundation." Waits, 978 F.2d
at 1102. While the court is correct in claiming that they do not have to adopt the view of one
party's expert witness, they must still adopt some view which can be clearly and easily understood
and applied by a jury.
151. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1102.
152. Id.
153. Id
154. Id
155. Court's Instruction No. 45, Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992). This
definition fails in its essential function, as it tells the jury nothing more than, if the voice merely
sounds like someone that you have heard, then a remedy may be found.
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heard in a sound recording (for example, Louis Armstrong's).
In order to rise to the level of a workable legal standard that can be
uniformly applied by a jury, distinctiveness in a pure voice misappropriation case requires an analysis of other singers. The court should allow the
jury to decide whether the individual charging appropriation can be said to
have a voice so original that the listener would immediately know its
source, or whether the listener could confuse the voice with other similar
singers. This standard may be applied more loosely where other factors are
involved, and the case is not based solely upon the performer's voice. For
example, the use of Bette Midler's voice in a commercial for Ford
automobiles was recognizable because the defendants in that case used the
voice in conjunction with a song that Midler had previously made popular.
In effect, the combination of the voice with the song narrowed the available
field of reference upon which the defendants could rely in claiming they
had not appropriated her voice. The two factors, taken together, created an
aural image of Midler because they constituted objective elements which
one could look to in order to find a deliberate appropriation.
3. "Widely Known"
The court instructed the jury that, to meet the Midler requirement of
"widely known," a singer's voice must be "known to a large number of
people throughout a relatively large geographic area."' 56 The defendants
contended that Waits was a cult figure; he was a singer who might have
amassed critical success, but hardly met the level of commercial success of
Bette Midler."57 The defendants requested jury instructions clarifying
what would satisfy5 a "large number of people throughout a relatively large
geographic area."'
The distinction between the court's instructions and the defendants'
proposed instructions becomes irrelevant, however, when analyzing the
court's application of Midler. The Midler court held "that when a
156. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1102.
157. Appellant's Opening Brief at 20, Waits (90-55981).
158. The requested instruction was:
A professional singer's voice is widely known if it is known to a large number of
people throughout a relatively large geographic area. On the other hand, a
professional singer whose voice is known only to a small number of people in a
relatively small geographic area (i.e., a neighborhood, a single city) does not have
a voice that is "widely known."
Appellant's Opening Brief at 20-21, Waits (No. 90-55981).
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distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately

imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have... committed a tort in
California."' 5 9 This statement of the law mandates that, in order to
recover under Midler, the plaintiff must be "widely known." However,
relying upon Motschenbacher,' ° the court found that "'well known' is a
relative term, and differences in the extent of celebrity status are adequately
reflected in the amount of damages recoverable."''
Thus, after explicitly
relying upon the Midler tort in finding the defendants liable, the court

essentially ignored the Midler analysis by creating an inference that even
if Tom Waits was only known to fifty people, he would still recover under
Midler. In so doing, the Waits court effectively eliminated the "widely

known" requirement.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF WAITS

The advertising industry is most at risk from the Waits decision. One
of the mainstays of advertising is celebrity endorsement. When the public
recognizes a celebrity appearing in a commercial endorsing a particular

product, sales of that product benefit by the association between the
individual and the product.'6 2 Thus, advertisers look to hire well-known

celebrities in order to maximize that association and therefore profit.
Performers who are highly recognizable can name their price when
approached with endorsement deals, because their goodwill'63 is easily

transferred to the product being sold.' 64
159. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 (emphasis added).
160. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
161. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1102.
162. When TDK, an audio tape manufacturer, aligned with Stevie Wonder, their goal was to
sell six million tapes in six months, but the company reached that sales mark in only four months.
Pamela G.Hollie, A Rush for Singers to Promote Goods, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1984, at Dl.
Similarly, when singer Michael Jackson entered into an endorsement contract with athletic shoe
maker L.A. Gear, officials at the shoe company attributed a nine point stock rise to the press
conference announcing the deal. Patrick Goldstein, LA. Gear's $20 Million Poster Boy, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 1989, at F64.
163. Some courts define goodwill as "reputation [and] an asset that allows... [a] firm to
generate greater earnings than a firm lacking goodwill." Joseph Montes, Celebrity Goodwill:
Nailing Jello To The Wall, 13 LOY. L.A. ENT. LJ.615, 618 (1993).
164. Soft drink manufacturer Pepsi-Cola is a major player in the endorsment wars. Pepsi paid
millions in endorsement money to Michael Jackson, Madonna, and basketball star Magic Johnson.
Peter Newcomb, The Magic Kingdom, FORBES, Oct. 2, 1989, at 139 (contracting with Jackson for
nine million dollars and Madonna for five million dollars); Bruce Horovitz, Marketing: Fishing
ForAn Ad Agency? ConsultantsHelp Clients Reel In The Big Ones, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 1989,
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Music is often used to pair products and performers.16 5 Advertising
companies use musicians because they can "deliver a targeted audience and
[they] have a special appeal and image."'" Many singers find a lucrative
side business in endorsements by singing their songs in ad campaigns."
However, some performers do not wish to have their personas identified
with commercial products through advertising,'6 8 as such conduct is seen
to detract "from their artistic integrity."' 69 Traditionally, these performers
had no recourse when an advertiser, in order to sell a product, either
imitated a voice or used a sound-alike to sing a song that the performer had
made popular. 70 However, the Ninth Circuit's attempt to remedy this
situation offers performers a potent tool in the expanded right of publicity.
The advertising industry is feeling the impact of the Midler and Waits
decisions. It is no coincidence that a spate of right of publicity suits
alleging sound-alike claims followed immediately on the coattails of Midler
at D6 (contracting with Johnson for three million dollars). L.A. Gear signed then-San Francisco
49er quarterback Joe Montana for three to five million dollars, and video game manufacturer Sega
of America, Inc. threw Montana a deal that was reported to be in excess of the amount paid by
L.A. Gear. Don Clark, Joe Montana'sHuge New Ad Contract,S.F. CHRON., March 22, 1990,
at Al.
The importance of this concept is clear when one watches how the advertising agencies
react when a superstar becomes embroiled in controversy. For example, after Burt Reynolds'
"messy split" with wife Loni Anderson, the bad press that followed prompted the Florida Citrus
Commission to pull all of its ads featuring the actor. Jeffry Scott, The Draw of Celeb Endorsers
May Start To FeelLike A Drag, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Sept. 7, 1993, at F3. Similarly, Magic
Johnson lost a number of endorsements after he announced that he had contracted HIV. Jeff Giles,
The Risks of Wishing Upon A Star, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 6, 1993, at 38. Pepsi officials stated that
they were "watching events closely in the police investigation into allegations that.. . Michael
Jackson sexually abused a 13-year-old boy." Scott, supra, at 3. One advertising executive
believed that "Pepsi [would] ... divorce themselves in a gentle way." Giles, supra, at 38.
165. Hollie, supra note 162, at Dl.
166. Id.
167. "The fees paid by advertising companies for the use of popular songs in commercials
can exceed $150,000 for a one-year use in a national campaign .... " Jeffrey Brabec, Music That
Sells (A Behind-the-Scenes Look at Advertising Music and Broadcast Performance Royalties),
1987 ENT. Pus. & THE ARTS HANDBOOK, at 346. See also David Hinckley, Ads Are Big
Business For Many Celebrities, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 31, 1992, at C6.
168. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461 (performer refused to endorse commercial product); Waits, 978
F.2d at 1097 (performer's dislike of commercial endorsements known in the industry). "Some
...writers feel that any identification with the selling of a consumer product can damage the
future potential of a copyright as it may hinder additional new recordings or other uses." Brabec,
supra note 167, at 347.
169. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1097.
170. Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970); Booth v. ColgatePalmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Davis v. Trans World Airlines, 297 F. Supp.
1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969). But see Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
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and Waits. Guitarist Carlos Santana recently reached a settlement
agreement with Miller Brewing Co. and the advertising firm of Backer
Spielvogel Bates Inc. after Santana sued, claiming an infringement of his
right of publicity.'' However, Santana's suit took the right of publicity
concept to a new level: Santana claimed that the guitar in a beer
1 72
commercial imitated Santana's version of "Black Magic Woman.
Interestingly, Santana did not own the copyright to the song, but claimed
that the song had become inextricably entwined with Santana's persona. 173 Similarly, and notably, after Santana's settlement, guitarist and
singer Chris Isaak recently "demanded that Infiniti Motor Car Co. stop
running an ad that feature[d] what he callied] a sound-alike guitar
instrumental lifted from Isaak's 1990 hit 'Wicked Game.""'
Ui Geller,
a noted psychic, sued the agency in charge of Timex's advertising, claiming
that they infringed on his right of publicity by portraying a "spoon-bender"
in one of their ads. 7 1 One day after the Midler decision was handed
down, singer Patti Page notified advertising agency AsherGould that she
was going to "file suit over a TV commercial the agency created ....The
spot.., included a rendition of 'Old Cape Cod,' a number popularized by
Ms. Page in the late 1950s.'"' 76 Bobby Darin's heirs jumped into the fray
recently when they sued McDonald's Corporation and their advertising
agency, Davis, Ball, and Colombatto, for ten million dollars, alleging that
the ad agency infringed upon Darin's right of publicity by airing a
commercial with a rendition of "Mack the Knife" in its "Mac Tonight" ad
campaign (referring to the Big Mac, a popular hamburger sold at
177
McDonald's).
Fortunately, some courts are maintaining their stance against the
uncontrollable expansion of the right of publicity: a district court in Detroit
recently dismissed a suit filed by singer Mitch Ryder against Molson
Breweries of Canada and advertiser MacLaren: Lintas, Toronto. 178 The
suit claimed that Molson and its advertising agency infringed upon Ryder's

171. Jim Doyle, CarlosSantanaSues Over TVAd, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 16, 1990, at A2; David
Savage, Supreme Court Upholds Copycat Ruling, L.A. TIMEs, March 24, 1992, at F4.
172. Doyle, supra note 171, at A2.
173. Id.
174. Savage, supra note 171, at F4.

175. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 n.8 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing
Geller v. Fallon McElligott, No. 90-Civ-2839 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1991)).
176. Marcy Magiera, Midler "Sound-Alike" Win Means Creative Changes, ADVERTISING
AGE, Nov. 6, 1989, at 2.
177. Id.
178. John Cortez, Sound-Alikes Get Court Win, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 19, 1990, at 51.
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right of publicity by producing an advertisement featuring a sound-alike
version of Ryder's song, "Devil With A Blue Dress On."' 9
The problem with the right of publicity in these cases is that there is
no clearly defined right and there are no guidelines to follow to avoid a
violation of that right. If the trend established by the Ninth Circuit
continues and extends to other jurisdictions, the question will become how
far can the Ninth Circuit reasonably slide down that slippery slope? Judge
Kozinski expressed his concern in White:
[I]t may seem unfair that much of the fruit of a creator's labor
may be used by others without compensation. But this is not
some unforeseen byproduct of our intellectual property system;
it is the system's very essence. Intellectual property law assures
authors the right to their original expression, but encourages
others to build freely on the ideas that underlie it. This result
is neither unfair nor unfortunate: It is the means by which
intellectual property law advances the progress of science and
80
art.
Advertisers will be forced to conduct extensive research to ensure that
every image that they use in their advertisements does not resemble or
sound like an individual that has already established the style portrayed in
the ad as their style of performing. This becomes an almost impossible
task, because the vague standard followed by the Waits court makes it
unlikely that an advertiser could determine any but the most obvious cases
through foresight. Because the monopoly that is conferred on a performer
through a right of publicity claim is unlimited, the potential for abuse is
frightening.
VI. CONCLUSION

Clearly, performers that have a commercial interest in their likenesses
or identities should have the right to reap the benefits of what they have
sown. In cases like Midler, the right of publicity may be the appropriate
vehicle for this recovery. On the other hand, there are some circumstances
in which the application of this right is completely out of place. When an
individual sings a certain way (e.g. Tom Waits), plays the guitar a certain
way (e.g. Carlos Santana), dances a certain way (e.g. Fred Astaire), tells a
179. I&
180. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1517 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
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joke a certain way (e.g. Andrew "Dice" Clay), takes a photograph a certain
way (e.g. Ansel Adams), or paints a picture a certain way (e.g. Georgia
O'Keefe), the question arises as to whether the courts should prevent any
and all future artists and performers from adopting that style or approach,
unless they first buy the rights from the original performer. If the right of
publicity exists as the Waits court asserts, then Tom Waits should have to
buy the rights to sing the way that he does from the estate of Louis
Armstrong. The question also arises as to who is the original creator of a
style, and therefore to whom an individual must turn in order to buy the
rights to perform and make a living using that style.
If the Ninth Circuit insists on choosing the right of publicity for a
Waits-type recovery, the very least it can do is make a sincere attempt to
define the elements of the Midler tort so that future parties will have an
idea as to what exactly constitutes its violation. If it does not, all that an
individual will need to do to drag a defendant into court is assert that the
defendant has appropriated some aspect of his identity. If successful in
court (which is the most likely result in California) that individual will be
able to prevent any future party from using that style of expression. More
likely, the owner of the right of publicity will reap the windfall that
accompanies a monopoly.
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